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THE (NEXT) BIG SHORT AND THE END OF THE ANTHROPOCENE 
 
M. Alexander Pearl* 
 
[People’s] intuitive expectations are governed by a consistent 
misperception of the world . . . .  
—Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman1 
 
Simply put, stories are a part, and seemingly an indispensable part, of 




It is incredibly difficult to imagine an event the likes of which humans 
have never seen before. That, in and of itself, renders the challenge to 
prepare for such an event even more difficult because there is no frame of 
reference pushing us to act. How do you prepare to avoid something which 
has never occurred in the history of human occupation? That is the 
challenge of climate change.  
I argue that the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and its aftermath parallel 
the Climate Crisis in critical ways that should inform our tactics. Of 
course, there are obvious critical differences as well. The Subprime Crisis 
was a predictive failure that involved the misallocation of risk and 
blindness to uncertainty. This Article examines the predictive failures of 
the Subprime Crisis by focusing on what makes probabilities more likely 
to be accurate and the circumstances in which some predictions blind us 
to the uncertainty of large-scale negative consequences. This Article 
employs the theory of the Black Swan and other critiques from Nassim 
Nicolas Taleb to explore the application of probability theory in the 
context of the Climate Crisis.  
At the same time, data and probabilities are insufficient to motivate 
both individuals and political entities to act. Even an accurate 
probabilistic assessment of global climate change risk is inadequate; the 
Climate Crisis demands a narrative that resonates with individuals at a 
local and emotional level. Narrative theory explains the difficulty 
                                               
* © 2019 M. Alexander Pearl. Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Center 
for Water Law and Policy, Texas Tech University School of Law. Enrolled citizen of the 
Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma. Presented at the University of Colorado Climate Change 
Colloquium. A version of this paper was presented to the Texas Tech University Climate 
Science Center. My thanks to Douglas Kysar, Sarah Krakoff, Jedidiah Purdy, William Boyd, 
Ann Carlson, Brigham Daniels, Noah Sachs, Jim Salzman, Tracy Pearl, Dr. Katharine 
Hayhoe, Jamie Baker, Alyson Drake, and Kathryn Almond. All mistakes are my own. 
1 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 76 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 105, 110 (1971). 
2 ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 419 (1993). 
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experienced in implementing legal solutions to mitigate the Climate Crisis. 
This Article synthesizes the link between narrative power in creating 
human understanding and our propensity for making bad predictions 
through the human cognitive bias research of Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky. While policy-makers, scientists, and political representatives 
play important roles in trying to shape public opinion, recent empirical 
research supports the idea that lawyers—through litigation—are best 




In the morning on the day after Christmas of 2004, Mai Khao Beach probably 
felt like any other tropical beach—white sands, turquoise water.3 The smell of salt 
water all around. The too-hot feeling of the sand on the bottom of bare feet and the 
laughter of children and adults against the backdrop of waves crashing on the beach. 
Tilly Smith was ten years old.4 On vacation with her family from their home in 
Britain, they went to southern Thailand for a beach vacation like thousands of 
families do each year. As she walked along the beach with her mother, father, and 
little sister that morning, she noticed the water begin to foam and fizzle, little 
whirlpools formed nearby, and the ocean started to recede and flow out. With panic 
in her eyes, she started shouting to her mother, Penny, and father, Colin, that there 
was going to be a tsunami.5 She was right. The tsunami that Tilly Smith accurately 
predicted would hit Phuket within ten minutes of her pleading with her parents to 
find high cover.6 Her father, after being convinced by his persistent daughter, 
notified a nearby security guard at the hotel—who happened to be Japanese and was 
familiar with tsunamis due to their history in Japan.7 The security guard quickly 
shouted for all the beachgoers to evacuate and make way inside the hotel.8  
                                               
3 Jessica Hornig, From Fear to Survival: Knowledge Is Key, ABC NEWS (Jan. 22, 
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/2020/fear-survival-knowledge-key/story?id=6691940 
[https://perma.cc/65VE-EJQV]. 
4 James Owen, Tsunami Family Saved by Schoolgirl’s Geography Lesson, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 18, 2005), https://educatoroutreach.uchicago.edu/sites/k12outreach.u 
chicago.edu/files/uploads/files/sti2013_arehart_nationalgeographic_tillysmith_tsunami.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JP6Y-85ER]. 
5 Id.; Colin Randall & Sebastien Berger, Honour for Young Girl Who Saved Tourists 
from Tsunami, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 26, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
uknews/1506286/Honour-for-young-girl-who-saved-tourists-from-tsunami.html [https:// 
perma.cc/N4XB-FNQ9]. 
6 Antonella Lazzeri, If I Hadn’t Spotted that the Sea Was Fizzing Then My Parents, 




8 Id.  
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Inside the hotel, Tilly was on an elevated floor in the lobby.9 She connected 
with her family, and they all watched the lobby doors burst open with the roar of 
seawater and heard the crashing and banging that came with it.10 They were safe. 
Her father hugged her tightly and, in shock, kept repeating, “What if we hadn’t 
listened to you?”11 How was a ten-year-old able to predict the worst tsunami to ever 
hit the modern world? Geography class.12 “Normally I was bored during 
geography,” Tilly would later say, “but our teacher[,] Andrew Kearney[,] had shown 
us a video of a tsunami in Hawaii and it had been really gripping.”13 Luckily, Tilly 
paid attention.14 Tilly is credited with saving the lives of everyone on that particular 
beach on that Boxing Day of 2004. If Tilly’s message had been discarded, the Smith 
family would have likely ended up like the other 230,000 people that were killed or 
lost as a part of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.15  
That 230,000 figure is just a number, a large one albeit, but it is an abstraction 
and a poor measure of what actually happened on that day. First-hand accounts, 
images, and videos provide the grit, heartbreak, and tragedy of the Sumatra tsunami. 
They depict the last moments of life for these people—siblings, parents, and spouses. 
Photographs capture the panic and terror on the faces of people fleeing the 
beachfront as the water emerges and confronts them.16 Videos from the event show 
an old man clinging to the side railing of a parking garage as rushing water filled the 
area.17 Author Jerry Thompson describes the scene: “Exhausted and in shock, he 
finally let go.”18 Throughout that region, the water tore away houses, belongings, 
cars, and buses and carried them off. Streets were then flooded, “full of death and 
floating debris.”19 More waves were to come, bringing more death. This says nothing 
of the aftermath of the tsunami, the consequences of such devastation and the 
hardship it presented to the region.  
This Article is about tsunamis of a different kind. It is about how we can 
anticipate dire problems, prepare for them, and either avoid their occurrence or 
mitigate their effects. It is about generating a legal action before the consequences 




12 Girl, 10, Used Geography Lesson to Save Lives, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 1, 2005, 10:50 
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1480192/Girl-10-used-geography-lesson-to-save-
lives.html [https://perma.cc/3GQP-MD4N]. 
13 Lazzeri, supra note 6. 
14 Due in no small part to her teacher’s effective use of in-class simulations, hands-on 
learning opportunities, and mixed media presentations—fellow law professors, take note. 
Owen, supra note 4. 
15 JERRY THOMPSON, CASCADIA’S FAULT xviii (2012). 
16 Alan Taylor, Ten Years Since the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, ATLANTIC (Dec. 26, 
2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/12/ten-years-since-the-2004-indian-ocean-
tsunami/100878/ [https://perma.cc/8G9Q-LUFJ].  
17 THOMPSON, supra note 15, at xvii. 
18 Id. at xviii. 
19 Id. 
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of the crises occur or worsen. The Sumatra tsunami is a metaphor for how we view 
the world and how we choose which actions to take—whether we stay on the beach 
or take high cover. This Article looks in detail at two crises, one finished and one 
ongoing. The completed crisis is the Subprime Mortgage Crisis of the 2000s (the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis).20 By no means have we fully recovered from it, but it is 
in a sense, finished. The ongoing crisis is the Climate Crisis.  
The Climate Crisis mirrors the Subprime Mortgage Crisis in important ways. 
Of course, the magnitude of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, while significant and 
pervasive, pales in comparison to the current and anticipated effects of the Climate 
Crisis. But they are similar in that the consequences—direct and indirect—are 
difficult to forecast thereby making the ramifications all the graver due to their 
uncertainty in time, locale, intensity, and cost. We should learn from the mistakes 
made by the actors and stakeholders of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and be 
proactive rather than reactive. In other words, we need to be Tilly Smith. Or, as 
described later in this Article, Meredith Whitney and Steve Eisman (among others), 
both of whom saw the structural problems in the financial system prior to and during 
the Subprime Mortgage Crisis.  
But we need more than just sound principles and data in order to compel action 
and legal intervention. In the context of climate change, there is no shortage of 
people that see the ocean receding or the water foaming. There is clear consensus 
among the scientific community that anthropogenic climate change is real and that 
we are living the current consequences. But the statistics and data are not moving 
the political or legal needle. The current Climate Crisis and our collective 
nonresponse lack a narrative or frame of reference. It is defined by data but has few 
stories and faces. The Climate Crisis needs a narrative that provides a framework for 
our collective understanding of what is at stake, thereby compelling a 
comprehensive, immediate, broad-spectrum legal response. The narrative is critical 
given our cognitive biases for decision-making and our penchant, as humans, to use 
heuristics in deciding what to believe and do. 
This is the great value in the parallel between the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
and the Climate Crisis. The Subprime Mortgage Crisis provides a reference point 
for us and a way of understanding the grave and systemic consequences brought 
about by climate change. People typically use a series of cognitive heuristics to make 
daily decisions. Most of the time, they are effective because they reach a rational 
decision in an efficient time frame. But occasionally, our heuristics fail us, and our 
actions are irrational and harmful. Therefore, it is imperative that we either (1) avoid 
the operation of heuristic shortcuts by processing information in a deep and 
analytical manner, or (2) use narrative to successfully inform our heuristics to reach 
the rational decision.  
In the context of the law, the Subprime Mortgage Crisis is helpful because it 
can demonstrate the consequences of regulatory and legal failure. In human 
psychology, the Subprime Mortgage Crisis is helpful because it is the potential 
                                               
20 It goes by many names; I will use the Subprime Mortgage Crisis to define the 
financial crisis of the mid to late 2000s. 
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frame of reference for comprehending the direct and indirect consequences of 
misjudging risk and uncertainty in complex pervasive systems. We must frame the 
issue of the Climate Crisis in the context of humanity at a local and personal level—
the tragedy of the man who slipped away as a consequence of an avoidable crisis. 
He was not simply one among 230,000 lost; he was perhaps a father, a spouse, and 
a friend. The narrative is critical—it draws us closer to the consequences. All too 
often, in the aftermath of a tragedy, people across the globe send thoughts and 
prayers but do little. But, if the tragedy happens in your hometown, on your street, 
or to your family, it is different. It feels different. The dangers of the Climate Crisis 
are not currently felt. 
What we do not fully appreciate in the age of the Climate Crisis is that we are 
all the man who slipped away in the Sumatra tsunami. Maybe not now, or next year, 
but we (or our offspring) will all be him. The people that slip away in the Climate 
Crisis will be my daughter, Tilly Smith, your mother, and your neighbor’s 
grandchildren. The opportunity to avoid that end is upon us. The Climate Crisis has 
moved past the arguments over data points or the accuracy of predictions because it 
is upon us and we can see the effects—the tragedies—in instances across the globe. 
This time is about how our own narratives end, why they end, and what we did with 
the knowledge we had. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. First, this Article looks at the bigger picture 
of what Tilly Smith did that day—she made a prediction. In examining the 
contemporary views on predictions and probability theory, the Article focuses on 
two authors and public intellectuals that represent important perspectives on 
prediction: Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Nate Silver. Part I focuses on the under-
theorized role of narrative in the context of crisis—specifically, the Climate Crisis. 
This Part argues that the level of abstraction and the prominence of numbers can 
slow the motivation to act. Part II utilizes cultural cognitive theory and longstanding 
research from Tversky and Kahneman on human cognitive biases to link our 
narrative and predictive failures together via a common causative basis. Next, a 
review of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, in terms of law-and-economic spheres with 
a focus on the regulatory action (or lack thereof) is necessary to understand the 
interaction between psychology, human action, and the role of narrative in the 
context of that crisis. In addition, the Article incorporates the views of both Silver 
and Taleb regarding predictions and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis. Part IV 
considers the Climate Crisis; the science, models, and predictions; public opinion; 
and Taleb’s and Silver’s views on climate change predictions and risk. In particular, 
one area of potential grave direct and indirect danger—the climate-water nexus—is 
explored especially regarding the ramifications of climate change in the water law 
context. Finally, the Article ends with recommendations for moving forward with a 
comprehensive legal response to the Climate Crisis as informed by the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis and the importance of the predictions, narrative, and cognition and 
in that process.  
  
388 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
I.  RISK ENGINEERING 
 
Predictions and forecasts are a part of everyday American life. Everything from 
the weather, the World Series, stock prices, and elections are the subject of 
predictions. They are made in all manner of ways: grandmothers, media pundits,21 
computers,22 groundhogs,23 and even an octopus.24  Some are good at predicting 
what may happen, others are not. Tilly Smith made a prediction that the receding 
ocean and foaming water was the precursor to a tsunami. Her prediction saved her 
and her family as well as countless others on Mai Khao Beach in 2004.25 Twelve 
years later, predictions about the U.S. presidential election were the subject of every 
evening news channel, news website, and twenty-four-hour news station—
understandably so, given the historic nature and intrigue surrounding the election. 
Everyone had a prediction about the outcome. The nearly unanimous view was that 
Secretary Hillary Clinton would win.26 Cast in terms of likelihood, the New York 
                                               
21 Katelyn Fossett, 16 Worst Predictions of 2016, POLITICO (Nov. 6, 2016, 7:33 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/2016-election-worst-predictions-230806 [https:// 
perma.cc/8HME-6UHH]; Charley Lanyon & Margaret Hartmann, Pundits’ Presidential 
Predictions: What the Map Will Look Like, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 8, 2016, 6:35 AM), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/11/pundits-predict-what-the-presidential-map-
will-look-like.html [https://perma.cc/CQ9L-DNTC]. 
22 Michael Kaplan, Wall Street Firm Uses Algorithms to Make Sports Betting Like Stock 
Trading, WIRED (Nov. 1, 2010, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2010/11/ff_midas/ 
[https://perma.cc/2ZVG-K462]; Emmett Knowlton, Microsoft’s Sports Algorithm Is 
Probably Better at Picking NFL Winners than You Are, FISCAL TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015), 
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/09/10/Microsoft-s-Sports-Algorithm-Probably-Better-
Picking-NFL-Winners-You-Are [https://perma.cc/QU8V-G4FP]. 
23 A 131—or 120 depending on various sources—year old tradition, Punxsutawney Phil 
(a groundhog), will come out of his burrow and if he sees his shadow, that means six more 
weeks of winter. Interestingly, Phil is not very accurate in his predictions. Remy Melina, 
How Accurate Are Punxsutawney Phil’s Groundhog Day Forecasts?, LIVESCIENCE (Feb. 2, 
2017), http://www.livescience.com/32974-punxsutawney-phil-weather-prediction-accuracy 
.html [https://perma.cc/YE6A-HGBQ]; Alanne Orjoux, More Winter, Early Spring, End of 
Days — Groundhog Day Predictions Vary, CNN http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/02/us/groun 
dhog-day-trnd/ [https://perma.cc/2LA5-2ZW7]. 
24 Paul the Octopus gained “international notoriety” upon his successful prediction of 
Germany’s national soccer team’s matches in the 2008 World Cup. Paul also correctly 
predicted Spain to prevail over the Netherlands in the 2008 World Cup Final. In response, 
Spain made him an honorary citizen, and Paul represented England as its Ambassador for 
the nation’s 2018 World Cup bid. Paul, the Octopus Who Predicted World Cup Matches, 
Dies, N.Y. TIMES: GOAL (Oct. 26, 2010), https://goal.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/paul-
the-octopus-who-predicted-world-cup-matches-dies/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7BAT-PYLF]; 
Paul the World Cup Octopus Dies in His Tank in Germany, BBC NEWS (Oct. 26, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11626050 [https://perma.cc/Q4ZN-X34K]. 
25 See Lazzeri, supra note 6. 
26 John Sides, A Comprehensive Average of Election Forecasts Points to a Decisive 
Clinton Victory, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost 
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Times,27 the Washington Post,28 and even Nate Silver (albeit to a lesser extent) on 
his website, FiveThirtyEight,29 rated Secretary Clinton’s chances at being elected as 
nearly a fait accompli. Donald Trump won. Why did ten-year-old Tilly Smith get it 
right when the collective statistical and political experts in the United States get it 
wrong? 
 
A.  The Iconoclast, Taleb 
 
What is surprising is not the magnitude of our forecast errors, but our 
absence of awareness of it.30  
 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb is many things: an iconoclast, blunt, harsh,31 a thinker,32 
a trader,33 an avid tweeter,34 and rarely boring. More formally, he is the 
Distinguished Professor of Risk Engineering at New York University.35 His most 
famous book, The Black Swan, describes the phenomenon of particular events that 
are (1) “outlier[s] . . . outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in 
the past can convincingly point to its possibility,” (2) “carr[y] an extreme impact,” 
and (3) are explained “after the fact” by “concoct[ed]” reasons that make the event 
appear “explainable and predictable.”36 Taleb writes that “since we left the 




27 Josh Katz, Who Will be President?, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT, https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2016/upshot/presidential-polls-forecast.html [https://perma.cc/T39Z-9XCU]. 
28 Post Opinion Writers Predict What Will Happen on Election Night, WASH. POST: 
POSTPARTISAN (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/ 
2016/11/08/post-opinion-writers-predict-what-will-happen-on-election-night/?utm_term=. 
95d3fd650b43 [https://perma.cc/K9AE-9GHB]. 
29 Nate Silver, Who Will Win the Presidency?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT https://projects.five 
thirtyeight.com/2016-election-forecast/ [https://perma.cc/MKZ6-D6QM]. 
30 NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN xxv (2d ed. 2010). 
31 Michiko Kakutani, You Are All Soft! Embrace Chaos!, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/books/antifragile-by-nassim-nicholas-taleb.html 
[https://perma.cc/A42S-9H2P]. 
32 Tim Morrison, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, TIME (Oct. 24, 2008), 
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1853531,00.html [https://perma.cc/XF 
4A-P53M]; Nassim Nicholas Taleb: Biography, JESUS & MARY SCH., 
http://www.jmrab.edu.lb/index.php/1/front-page-news/author-of-the-week/849-nassim-
nicholas-taleb [https://perma.cc/87K9-73AS ]. 
33 Morrison, supra note 32. 
34 Nassim Nicholas Taleb (@nntaleb), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/nntaleb 
[https://perma.cc/6WB6-6YHV]. 
35 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, NYU TANDON SCH. ENGINEERING, 
http://engineering.nyu.edu/people/nassim-nicholas-taleb [https://perma.cc/8EYK-5JY7]. 
36 TALEB, supra note 30, at xxii; Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1278–79 (2014); Chad D. Emerson, A Troubled House of Cards: 
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Pleistocene, some ten millennia ago, the effect of these Black Swans has been 
increasing.”37 Increased complexity of the world breeds more Black Swan events.38 
An essential aspect of Taleb’s book is not the Black Swan itself, but the phenomenon 
of “act[ing] as if it does not exist! . . . [A]lmost all ‘social scientists’ . . . have 
operated under the false belief that their tools could measure uncertainty.”39 Another 
core point for Taleb is “our blindness with respect to randomness, particularly large 
deviations.”40  
Speaking on the 2004 Sumatra tsunami, he says “[h]ad it been expected, it 
would not have caused the damage it did—the areas affected would have been less 
populated, an early warning system would have been put in place. What you know 
cannot really hurt you.”41 The same goes for the terrorist attacks of September 11. 
For Taleb, rare events equal uncertainty.42 He argues that academics, a primary 
target of his criticisms, are responsible for miscalculating the likelihood of Black 
Swans by studying only the “usual.”43 This blinds them, and significantly misleads 
everyone else, in thinking that large-impact events simply will not occur.44 By 
“focusing on the known,” he suggests, the future will be increasingly less 
predictable.45  
Taleb also talks about the “triplet of opacity.”46 He believes “[h]istory is 
opaque. You see what comes out, not the script that produces events, the generator 
of history.”47 There is an “incompleteness” in our understanding of these events 
                                               
Examining How the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 Fails to Resolve the 
Foreclosure Crisis, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 561, 565–66 (2008); Dru Stevenson & Nicholas J. 
Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of Big Data, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1337, 1385 (2015). 
37 TALEB, supra note 30, at xxii. 
38 Id. 
39 Id.; Dru Stevenson, The Function of Uncertainty Within Jury Systems, 19 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 513, 526–27 (2012). 
40 TALEB, supra note 30, at xxiii; Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 36, at 1385–86; 
J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz, Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing Legal Complexity, 
101 IOWA L. REV. 191, 231 (2015). 
41 TALEB, supra note 30, at xxiv. 
42 Id. at xxviii. 
43 Id. at xxviii–xxix. 
44 Id. at xxviii; James Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk 
Management in Finance and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 731, 742–43 
(2009). 
45 TALEB, supra note 30, at xxxii (emphasis added); see also Baradaran, supra note 36, 
at 1278–79 (referencing Taleb’s “black swan theory” and explaining that “any model that 
uses past events to predict the probability of future events suffers from a black-swan bias”); 
Fanto, supra note 44, at 742–43 (discussing Taleb’s criticisms of risk modeling); Stevenson, 
supra note 39, at 524–25 (explaining that Taleb’s theory of system-fragility “relies on the 
principle that large organizations that continually rely on a model that fails to account for all 
possible failures render themselves inherently susceptible to hidden dangers”). 
46 TALEB, supra note 30, at 8–15. 
47 Id. at 8. 
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since the contents and mechanics of the box are unknown.48 Our inability to 
understand history stems from three traits: (1) “the illusion of understanding” a 
world that is much more “complicated (or random)” than thought,49 (2) the 
“distortion” that comes from the ability to analyze events only after they have 
occurred which allows them to be presented in a “clearer and more organized” 
fashion,50 and (3) the Platonic inclination to generate “intellectual maps of reality” 
composed of “[m]odels and constructions” which provide maps of our reality that 
do not actually reflect the messiness and imprecision of the world.51 These factors 
convince people that the world is precise, well-understood, and predictable—which 
is not necessarily the case.52 The categorization of our world, via models and 
constructs, “always produces reduction in true complexity.”53 Taleb cautions that 
“[a]ny reduction of the world around us can have explosive consequences since it 
rules out some sources of uncertainty; it drives us to a misunderstanding of the fabric 
of the world.”54 
But some problems or events are easier to understand—less complex—than 
others. Taleb acknowledges this in what he calls Mediocristan and Extremistan.55 
Mediocristan entails circumstances and populations where there are “few extreme 
successes or failures.”56 Under such parameters where the sample size is large, “no 
single instance will significantly change the aggregate or the total.”57 Information 
about such instances of Mediocristan are reliable and amenable to accurate 
predictions; in Taleb’s words, “[w]hat you can know from data in Mediocristan 
augments very rapidly with the supply of information”58 because there is no 
possibility of significant deviations. In contrast, Taleb considers the opposite 
circumstance—Extremistan.59 Under those conditions, “inequalities [within the 
group] are such that one single observation can disproportionately impact the 
aggregate, or the total.”60 Taleb illustrates the contrast by imagining an example of 
                                               
48 Id. 
49 Id.; see also Fanto, supra note 44, at 742 (“catastrophic events are always new and 
unimaginable . . . risk management actually enhances risk because it leads risk modelers and 
their followers to believe that risk is ‘managed’ (an impossible task)”); Stevenson & 
Wagoner, supra note 36, at 1385–86 (explaining that predictions, information, and forecasts 
can cause decision makers to be overconfident so that they take more risks). 
50 TALEB, supra note 30, at 8. 
51 Id. at xxx, 8. 
52 Id. at 9. 
53 TALEB, supra note 30, at 16. 
54 Id. at 16. 
55 Id. at 26. 
56 Id. at 303. 
57 Id. at 32 (emphasis omitted). 
58 Id. at 34. 
59 Id. at 33. 
60 Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Stevenson, supra note 39, at 526 (explaining how 
business leaders concentrate authority and implement programs to reduce their exposure to 
certain known liabilities, while ignoring “the unknowable perils that can affect everything at 
once”). 
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selecting one thousand people at random and evaluating both their (1) weight and 
height and (2) net worth.61 In the context of weight and height, even if the sample 
included the most extreme ends of the population—say Shaquille O’Neal62 or 
Simone Biles63—they would not represent much more of the total sum than their 
peers.64 Regarding net worth, if Warren Buffett65 or Jay-Z66 were in the sample, they 
might very well represent 90–95 percent of the group’s total net worth. Predictions 
in Mediocristan are reliable. By sampling the weights of one thousand people, you 
can predict average weights for people on the planet, and they will by and large be 
accurate. Not so for Extremistan.67 Taleb contends that the list of things that belong 
in Extremistan are much longer than those that belong in Mediocristan.68  
The last remaining key concept from The Black Swan relevant to the idea of 
predictions concerns the problem of induction, or more colorfully, the parable of the 
American turkey.69 On a farm with other turkeys, a turkey will get fed each day by 
someone, and each feeding confirms “the bird’s belief that it is the general rule of 
life to be fed every day by friendly members of the human race.”70 However, on the 
day before Thanksgiving, the turkey will have a completely unexpected experience: 
“[i]t will incur a revision of belief” when it is killed and prepared for dinner.71 This 
is the problem of induction whereby projections about the future are made based on 
past data.72 The question, then, is how do we know whether we are a turkey? How  
 
                                               
61 TALEB, supra note 30, at 32–33. 
62 SHAQUILLE O’NEAL, BASKETBALL REFERENCE, http://www.basketball-
reference.com/players/o/onealsh01.html [https://perma.cc/N6YK-X2GL] (discussing the 
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63 Luan Peszek, Simone Biles, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica. 
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64 TALEB, supra note 30, at 32. 
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estimated net worth, which is $610 million). 
67 TALEB, supra note 30, at 32–33. 
68 Id. at 35. 
69 Id. at 40. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 TALEB, supra note 30, at 41; see also Baradaran, supra note 36, at 1279–80 
(explaining how risk models for the housing market only accounted for inflation risk that 
had been encountered before in the 1970s and 1980s but failed to “account for the possibility 
of a precipitous decline in national housing prices” that had not been seen before). 
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do we know whether we are in Mediocristan or Extremistan? Taleb’s forceful thesis 
focuses on the idea that, in general, we think we understand more about the world—
and can make more accurate predictions concerning the future—than we actually 
do. 
 
B.  The Statistician, Silver 
 
We love to predict things—and we aren’t very good at it.73 
 
Nate Silver is known for many things in different spheres. A self-proclaimed 
nerd, Silver is a prominent blogger, writer, and founder and operator of the statistics 
and forecasting website, FiveThirtyEight.74 In the sports world, he is recognized for 
developing the PECOTA system, which attempts to predict the statistics of Major 
League Baseball players.75 In politics, he is known for his website, FiveThirtyEight, 
and his successful prediction in the 2008 election of all thirty-five U.S. Senate races 
and the presidential race outcome in forty-nine of fifty states.76 Silver represents, for 
the purposes of this Article, the view that it is possible to understand and accurately 
predict events in the world. 
Important parameters, or qualifiers, exist for Silver in developing forecasts and 
predictions. “Data driven predictions can succeed—and they can fail. It is when we 
deny our role in the process that the odds of failure rise.”77 The problem with 
predicting the future, Silver contends, is in part due to the fact that “[w]e are wired 
to detect patterns.”78 One problem with detecting patterns is that seeing objects in 
complicated situations requires some level of generalization, which can create 
patterns where there are none in reality.79 Silver describes this as looking for a signal 
in the noise—we mistake the noise for a signal—and do so because we have a basic 
human instinct to see the patterns.80 Silver acknowledges the subjectivity and bias 
that goes into formulating a model and predictions but recognizes that hope in 
formulating better predictions lies in, among other things, falsifiability.81 Finally, 
Silver recognizes that some ideas or phenomenon cannot be tested at all precisely 
because falsifying (or testing) the accuracy of the model takes too long, or the sample 
size is too small or infrequent.82 The solution, posits Silver, is becoming 
                                               
73 NATE SILVER, SIGNAL AND NOISE 13 (2015). 
74 Adam Sternbergh, The Spreadsheet Psychic, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 12, 2008), 
http://nymag.com/news/features/51170/ [https://perma.cc/KBD9-CZVJ]. 
75 SILVER, supra note 73, at 9. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 12. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 12–13. 
81 Id. at 14–15. 
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“comfortable with probability and uncertainty” and “think[ing] more carefully about 
the assumptions and beliefs that we bring to a problem.”83 
Silver describes phenomena that are susceptible to accurate predictions and 
explains why they are. Baseball, chess, and meteorology have all demonstrated areas 
where accurate forecasts are achievable.84 The statistics of baseball players may be 
accurately forecasted for several reasons. First, baseball players—in contrast to 
football players—“are largely responsible for their own statistics.”85 Silver says that 
“[t]here are relatively few problems involving complexity and nonlinearity. The 
causality is easy to sort out.”86 In addition, baseball players produce an enormous 
data set with which to test the hypothesis against—this emphasizes the importance 
of falsifiability that Silver trumpets as essential to developing a proper forecast.87 A 
good forecast for a baseball player, says Silver, will do three things: (1) contextualize 
players’ statistics, (2) “separate out skill from luck,” and (3) account for the 
relationship between players’ age and their performance.88 Silver acknowledges that 
the system he developed is different than other systems designed to predict statistical 
outcomes for baseball players in that its “forecasts were probabilistic . . . , outlining 
a range of possible outcomes for each player.”89 This idea in itself accounts for some 
degree of uncertainty within the system of baseball statistics that is not subject to 
certain future prediction. 
Using the rich, and very long historical data set available to statisticians, they 
can develop a system to forecast likely outcomes—a range of possibilities for 
players. All things that account for how successful a batter is can be examined using 
the data available. As Silver points out, a high batting average (success at getting 
hits in a plate appearance) is easier to obtain in the Boston Red Sox’s home 
stadium—Fenway Park—because it is a smaller field than those in other baseball 
stadiums.90 By accounting for a given player’s performance in a given stadium, 
statisticians can develop “park factors” to account for these distinctions.91 A failure 
to do this might overvalue a player who has played most of their games in Fenway 
Park. Other issues similar to these park factors exist in baseball. But there is data 
available that may be used to incorporate those distinctions resulting in better 
forecasts of likely possibilities for player performance in the future.  
Chess is another example of a phenomenon susceptible to good predictions. In 
chess, there is complete knowledge of the rules governing the game and the available 
pieces.92 Chess presents a challenge to a person’s information processing 
capability—the usefulness of prediction in chess arises not from uncertainty as all 
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85 Id. at 80. 
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92 Id. at 267. 
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pieces and moves are known—but from our inability to understand all our options 
because it extends “beyond our capacity.”93 The capacity problem is mitigated by 
applying a heuristic approach. A heuristic approach involves “employing rules of 
thumb when a deterministic solution to a problem is beyond our practical 
capacities.”94 These rules of thumb are generalizations about the options available 
and which options are best. Computers can help solve this problem because of their 
capacity for calculations. Computers do some things much better than humans: they 
do not get tired or emotional in the context of a chess match.95 Silver points out that 
this alone does not ensure an accurate prediction: “If you give a computer bad data, 
or devise a foolish set of instructions for it to analyze, it won’t spin straw into 
gold.”96 The capacity problem is solved by computers in fields “where the system 
abides by relatively simple and well-understood laws, but where the equations that 
govern the system must be solved many times over in order to produce a good 
forecast.”97 Chess and baseball are fields in which good forecasts are achievable 
because they behave according to well-understood rules. In contrast, Silver notes 
that forecasts are not as good when they seek to make predictions about the field of 
economics or earthquakes because “our understanding of root causes is blurrier and 
the data is noisier.”98  
 
C.  Common Ground 
 
Taleb and Silver agree in principle on four items. First, Taleb’s critique of our 
propensity to “Platonify” 99—the mapping of well-defined and clean objects onto the 
world while ignoring the messy and blurrier reality—is consistent with Silver’s 
contention that we tend to “make approximations and assumptions about the world 
that are much cruder than we realize.”100 Of course, Taleb and Silver may disagree 
about which fields are messy and which are clean, but they both describe the same 
flaw that impairs accurate predictions.  
Two additional points of agreement stem from the same problem: human bias. 
Taleb describes the “narrative fallacy,” which is the “need to fit a story or pattern to 
a series of connected or disconnected facts.”101 Silver agrees that, as humans, we 
tend to want to see patterns and find the “signal in the noise” even though it may not 
really be there.102 In addition, Silver’s discussion of seeing these patterns gets to the 
                                               
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 See, e.g., Tracy Pearl, Fast and Furious: The Misregulation of Driverless Cars, 73 
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same core as Taleb’s description of the illusion of understanding—that we 
understand a great deal more about the world than we actually do—from his “triplet 
of opacity.”103  
Finally, both theorists agree that certain fields may be subject to accurate 
forecasting and others are not. Taleb describes these contrasting fields as 
Mediocristan and Extremistan, and Silver identifies the distinguishing characteristic 
as fields that function according to well-understood and simple rules versus those 
that are complex, blurry, and not well-understood. All those points of common 
ground among them are interconnected. Much of the concern over the accuracy of 
the prediction lies in what you are trying to predict (a specific outcome versus a 
range of likely possibilities), which field you are operating in (Mediocristan versus 
Extremistan), and whether you see the world’s messy state or smooth it to fit your 
pattern (Platonify versus Noisy Reality). In order to understand whether the 
prediction is reliable, these are the questions to ask about the fundamental aspect of 
the field being forecasted. If we are certain that a particular prediction pertains to a 
field of Mediocristan, where we clearly understand the simple rules at work, and we 
have a lot of historical data to falsify our forecast, then we should get a clear 
recommendation to which we conform our behavior. In other words, you get Tilly 
Smith. She acts in congruence with her prediction. But this is not always the case. 
This bears on a different question: why people do not act consistent with accurate 
forecasting. 
 
II.  NARRATIVE, LAW, AND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 
 
If we can accurately predict an outcome—assuming that the principles 
described above by Silver and Taleb are followed—then as rational actors, our 
human actions should conform to that outcome. As Taleb said, “[w]hat you know 
cannot really hurt you.”104 But facts, data, and accurate forecasts about the future do 
not always compel the rational behavior consistently with that expectation.  
 
A.  Narrative, Understanding, and Law 
 
Law lives on narrative.105 
 
Using narrative in the context of law and legal advocacy is an idea as old as the 
profession itself.106 An inquiry into the value and importance of narrative certainly 
goes beyond the legal profession and the storytelling dimension of law. However, 
examining how narrative functions in the context of law informs our understanding 
of the role narrative plays in broader human understanding.  
                                               
103 TALEB, supra note 30, at 8. 
104 Id. at xxiv. 
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106 Id. at 112. 
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Dr. Jerome Bruner, one of the most prominent psychologists of the twentieth 
century, has said that the narrative—a series of events expressed by an agent—is a 
fundamental and instinctive process of the human condition.107 He is not alone in 
this claim. Marshall Grossman contends that the “construction of narrative is an 
essential activity of the human mind.”108 Chester and Sneddon argue that even if 
narrative is not inherently and uniquely human, even if narrative is learned or 
imposed externally in some sense, “narrative is certainly a predominant method 
employed to distill and disseminate information.”109 This is readily apparent by even 
“a cursory review of popular culture and media [which] reveals extensive use and 
reliance on the power of narrative.”110 They affirm that “[n]arrative techniques 
facilitate the composition and production of an accessible, and often memorable, 
text.”111 Bernard Jackson determines that narrative is a “major (perhaps the major) 
form of cultural communication of common-sense notions” and that it “is the mode 
in which many of our value-judgments are stored and transmitted—rather than being 
conceptualised or communicated in analytical discourse.”112  
Exploration of the intersectionality of narrative and law is not necessarily 
new.113 It is a rich and multilayered confluence of disciplines. Professor Anthony 
                                               
107 See JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 45 (rev. ed. 1990) (identifying the human 
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Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141 (1997) (advocating for more precise 
definitions and terminology surrounding the discussion of legal narratives); Peter Brooks, 
Narrativity of the Law, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 1 (2002); Peter Brooks, Narrative 
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Amsterdam, noted law professor and lawyer, and the previously mentioned Dr. 
Jerome Bruner explored the role of narrative in the law in their book, Minding the 
Law.114 In the context of a legal situation, the answers to questions of fact are not 
wholly dependent upon logic and analytical coherence, instead, “we are coming to 
recognize that both the questions and the answers in such matters of ‘fact’ depend 
largely upon one’s choice . . . of some overall narrative as best describing what 
happened or how the world works.”115 How those facts fit within a narrative that, to 
the listener, seems to explain the circumstances leads to adherence. Even more, 
stories “are not just recipes for stringing together a set of ‘hard facts’ . . . . [S]tories 
construct the facts that comprise them.”116 Amsterdam and Bruner go on to say that 
“[f]or this reason, much of human reality and its ‘facts’ are not merely recounted by 
narrative but constituted by it.”117 The nature of things in the world  
 
may take the shape of rules and principles, institutions . . . , values and 
goals. However we conceive of them, they are grounded in what our 
culture designates as mattering. And what does or doesn’t matter to a 
culture can be traced back through the culture’s stories, its genres, to its 
enduring myths. Narrative is the carrier of those myths and, at the same 
time, our means for recognizing that a present situation needs telling in a 
way linked to this myth or that one.118  
 
A seminal work of Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, reinforces these ideas. 
Cover focused on narrative in the law and argued that “[n]o set of legal institutions 
or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning.”119 
In other words, law derives meaning from narrative in critical ways. Some 
background on Cover’s work is necessary, and Samuel Levine’s thoughtful 
dissection of Cover’s writing is instructive.120  
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discussed more by legal decision makers); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling 
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According to Cover a nomos is a “normative universe,” a “world of right 
and wrong, of lawful and unlawful.” Although “formal institutions of the 
law, and the conventions of a social order are, indeed, important to that 
world,” Cover is careful to emphasize that they are “but a small part of the 
normative universe.” 121  
 
Levine describes Cover’s point as reiterating the idea that the institution of the 
law, rights, and limitations are only “understood in the context of the narratives that 
[provide] meaning.”122 Narrative plays an essential role in forming the nomos—“a 
world in which we live”123—by locating these legal concepts in a context we 
understand.124 Levine refers to these narratives that connect legal principles as 
myths—just as Bruner and Amsterdam do.125 These myths allow law to make sense 
in the broader context of society, community mores, and human conduct.126 The 
narrative aids in defining facts, how they fit together, the functioning of the world 
we encounter, and the meaning of law. 
Law is a “concept rooted in ‘the sacred narratives of our world.’”127 Narrative, 
be it within the confines of a legal trial or the broader sense of the functioning of our 
world, cements our understanding. This is more precisely put by Steven Winter 
when he identifies the “attraction of narrative” as stemming from the fact “that it 
corresponds more closely to the manner in which the human mind makes sense of 
experience than does the conventional, abstracted rhetoric of law.”128 Narrative 
allows us to make meaning out of our human experience.129 “In narrative, we take 
experience and configure it in a conventional and comprehensible form. This is what 
gives narrative its communicative power . . . .”130 It serves “as a link between 
experience and the effective crystallization of social mores.”131 Finally, 
“narratives . . . are the trajectories plotted upon material reality by our 
imaginations.”132 
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B.  Narrative and Prediction 
 
To be human is to seek coherence, constantly to engage in an “effort 
after meaning.”133 
 
A strong point of agreement between Taleb and Silver concerns the propensity 
of people to see patterns in the noisy data134 and our urge to sand down the rough 
edges of reality so they resemble the nice clean lines of the illusions of our 
preexisting view of the world.135 Indeed, one criterion for a Black Swan event is that, 
after the fact, we explain the event by reverse engineering its occurrence in order for 
it to conform to our sense of the world—a narrative that we know. Narrative is a tool 
we use, a heuristic as Silver describes it. Cover, Bruner, and other thinkers have 
identified it as an essential tool and perhaps even an innate one.136  
Narrative can be used to make bad predictions by shoring up the 
oversimplification of the world or increased—misplaced—reliance on historical 
information. For example, we can return to Taleb’s turkey parable. Imagine some 
other farm animal—perhaps a pig from a farm owned by George Orwell—says to 
the turkey, “The human doesn’t really have your best interests at stake. He took a 
turkey inside the house last month and that turkey never came back.” The nomos for 
the turkey might be defined by the longstanding experience of having a human feed 
it each day, which the narrative “humans are nice” supports. The turkey could 
reasonably discard the Orwellian pig’s outlier information because it is so 
inconsistent with the turkey’s understanding of the world.  
The story that the pig is spinning—that humans conspired to create an entire 
world just for the sake of fattening them up to be killed and eaten—simply does not 
ring true. This is an important tactic in legal storytelling at trial. Determining the 
objective truth is not necessarily the goal, instead, the goal is the development of a 
plausible story.137 This idea is based in the theory of narrative coherence, which is 
relevant “in the absence of truth based upon observation.”138 A fundamental 
challenge is to differentiate between the narrative that blinds us to useful inconsistent 
information and the narrative that helps us to understand our world and 
circumstances. 
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C.  Defining Narrative 
 
Knowing how to tell [narratives] and to comprehend them may be part of 
the human survival kit.139 
 
In the context of prediction, defining narrative as inherently bad or 
automatically blinding misses the point. Narrative is an essential and unavoidable 
aspect of human cognition and community culture and method of understanding our 
world. With the importance of narrative in human cognition and belief established, 
it is critical to define the general contours of a narrative. A map of “those essential 
features that give [narrative] its form and that serve to convert ‘things in the world’ 
into story, real or fictional” is necessary.140  
Scholars from a variety of disciplines have defined narrative.141 Amsterdam and 
Bruner provide this description: a narrative   
 
needs a cast of human-like characters, beings capable of willing their own 
actions, forming intentions, holding beliefs, having feelings. It also needs 
a plot with a beginning, a middle, and an end, in which particular 
characters are involved in particular events. The unfolding of the plot 
requires (implicitly or explicitly): 
(1) an initial steady state grounded in the legitimate ordinariness of things 
(2) that gets disrupted by a Trouble consisting of circumstances 
attributable to human agency or susceptible to change by human 
intervention, 
(3) in turn evoking efforts at redress or transformation, which succeed or 
fail, 
(4) so that the old steady state is restored or a new (transformed) steady 
state is created, 
(5) and the story concludes by drawing the then-and-there of the tale that 
has been told into the here-and-now of the telling through some coda—
say, for example, Aesop’s characteristic moral of the story.142 
 
Narrative is powerful in conveying information and knowledge to human 
beings. We see the world through stories. We tell ourselves stories about our lives 
and how we understand events in the world. But the primacy of narrative is not 
simply cultural, abstract, or theoretical. The groundbreaking work of Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky characterized their career-long devotion to 
scientifically documenting the connection between narrative, predictions, 
uncertainty, subjective bias, and human cognition. The next Part examines these 
connections.   
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III.  HUMAN COGNITIVE BIASES AND DECISION-MAKING 
 
There is an intuitive appeal to the idea that narrative drives human 
understanding, but there is also a scientific psychological basis for that principle as 
well. In addition, errors in evaluating risk and acknowledging uncertainty are more 
than mathematical or statistical mistakes. The thesis advanced by Taleb and Silver 
is supported by scientific principles, the discovery of which are famously attributed 
to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky.143 Tversky and Kahneman explain and link 
these two concepts: the power of narrative and the probabilistic errors humans 
typically make.  
Kahneman and Tversky wrote that people’s “intuitive expectations are 
governed by a consistent misperception of the world.”144 This comment focuses on 
the errors we make in understanding, and they are not due simply to our being tricked 
or deceived by some external force or agent. They have argued, and shown with 
empirical evidence, that our own subjective cognitive biases prevent us from making 
rational decisions.145 In other words, we often stack the deck against ourselves 
through these biases, called heuristics.  
Heuristics are mental shortcuts we use to make decisions more quickly. They 
pervade everything we do on a daily basis. “[P]eople rely on a limited number of 
heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and 
predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are 
quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors.”146 In their 
groundbreaking article, Tversky and Kahneman focused on three biases: 
representativeness, availability, and anchoring.147  
Representativeness concerns the tendency of people to evaluate the likelihood 
of an event by ascertaining a similar circumstance and assuming that the likelihoods 
will be close to the same.148 For example, Tversky and Kahneman considered the 
thought experiment as to how one might assess the probability that a person, Steve, 
belonged to a particular profession—farmer, airline pilot, physician, librarian, or 
salesperson.149 Steve was described as “very shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful, 
but with little interest in people or in the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he 
has a need for order and structure, and a passion for detail.”150 Steve sounds like a 
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librarian because he has the traits that relate to the stereotype of a librarian—in other 
words, they are similar—or representative. The problem, Tversky and Kahneman 
point out, is that ordering probability in this way, by representativeness, disregards 
the prior probabilities of the outcomes. There are more farmers than librarians so 
that fact alone should “enter into any reasonable estimate of the probability that 
Steve is a librarian rather than a farmer.”151 But, the stereotype—or narrative—
dominates the thinking and derails the correct attribution of probability based on the 
data. Our own internal nomos distracts us from the raw facts. Another aspect of the 
representativeness heuristic bears emphasizing. Tversky and Kahneman called it 
“the law of small numbers.”152 This is the idea that sample size is irrelevant in 
predicting outcomes. Therefore, this compels the expectation that when random 
samples are selected from a population, we have a belief that those two samples will 
be “more similar” to each other and to the larger population “than sampling theory 
predicts, at least for small samples.”153  
The availability heuristic focuses on a person’s ability to “assess the 
frequency . . . or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or 
occurrences can be brought to mind.”154 For purposes here, primarily three concepts 
affect the availability of occurrences: retrievability, salience, and imaginability.155 
Retrievability deals with the degree to which a person is familiar with an event 
occurring—the more familiar the event is, the more available it is and the more likely 
it is to be recalled in the person’s mind.156 Salience refers to the idea that more 
prominent events will be more readily available. For example, the impact of seeing 
a giant tsunami destroy an entire town will have a greater impact on the “subjective 
probability” of the recurrence of such an event than if someone were to merely read 
about the event in a book.157 Likewise, salience also occurs in relation to how recent 
the occurrence was observed—more recent occurrences are judged to be an 
indication of a higher frequency of happening.158 
Where there are no retrievable or salient instances of an event occurring, people 
assess the likelihood of an event happening via imagination.159 The ease or difficulty 
in imagining an event’s occurrence affects the subjective probability that it will 
indeed occur. “[T]he risk involved in an undertaking may be grossly underestimated 
if some possible dangers are either difficult to conceive of, or simply do not come 
to mind.”160  
Finally, anchoring focuses on the heuristic that people make estimations based 
on the starting point or beginning value, and then adjust and come to a final 
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determination.161 Empirical data shows that “different starting points yield different 
estimates, which are biased toward the initial values.”162 The starting point, or initial 
frame, is likely to prevent the individual from considering an adjustment that 
significantly deviates from the initiating point, thereby leading to errors in judgment 
of probability and risk.163 
At the end of their groundbreaking paper, Tversky and Kahneman argue that a 
“better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could 
improve judgments and decisions in situations of uncertainty.”164 Indeed, Taleb and 
Silver both suggest the same thing—we are not to be trusted with our own intuitive 
judgments about risk, uncertainty, and probability.  
Related to the errors from human cognitive biases described by Tversky and 
Kahneman is the emerging research on cultural cognition. In some sense, these are 
two conflicting models for why people make irrational decisions and errors of risk 
assessment.165 Professor Dan Kahan is the most recognized and prolific scholar on 
this topic and broke new ground in his application of this concept to legal and 
nonlegal fields. Cultural cognition concerns the 
 
tendency of individuals to fit their perceptions of risk and related factual 
beliefs to their shared moral evaluations . . . . The cultural cognition thesis 
asserts that individuals are psychologically disposed to believe that 
behavior they (and their peers) find honorable is socially beneficial and 
behavior they find base socially detrimental.166  
 
Kahan and other theorists explain that the cultural cognition thesis derives from two 
related disciplines: anthropology and social psychology.167 The cultural theory of 
risk advanced by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky identified a “typology of 
cultural worldviews.”168  
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Professor David Jaros summarized the typology as follows:  
 
Persons exhibiting a “high grid” worldview believe in a highly stratified 
society in which roles, resources, opportunities, and the like are distributed 
based on clear and generally immutable characteristics like gender, class, 
and lineage. Conversely, persons believing that such characteristics should 
have no bearing on the distribution of roles, resources, and opportunities 
have a “low grid,” or egalitarian, worldview. A person with a “high group” 
worldview believes that society should be composed of interconnected, 
mutually supportive groups that share tasks and regularly interact with 
each other. A person with a “low group” perspective is highly 
individualistic and views the world as being composed of competitive 
individuals who are primarily responsible for their own well-being.169 
 
Kahan asserts that the typology alone does not condition an individual’s action 
or decision—social psychology fills that gap.170 The basic premise is that cultural 
values shade our perceptions. One particular mechanism is “cognitive dissonance 
avoidance.”171 This psychological mechanism describes the significant difficulty for 
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an individual to “entertain beliefs about what’s harmless and what’s harmful that 
force one to renounce commitments and affiliations essential to one’s identity.”172 
Another key mechanism is “affect” which connects factual belief to cultural value.173 
Our subjective judgments about the degree of harm or danger in an activity are 
“informed by the visceral reactions those activities trigger.”174 Of course, those 
reactions, and whether they are good or bad, are largely informed by our cultural 
values.175 Kahan argues that the last mechanism is the most important—group 
identity formation.176 Formulations of risk are often difficult to make without the aid 
of others. These calculations are made more challenging when an individual is 
confronted with seemingly conflicting evidence. So individuals rely on those they 
trust to make the assessment and determine which risks are valid and dangerous as 
compared to those that are made up or not dangerous.177 Kahan asserts that the 
people we trust are almost always those who tend to share the same worldview.178 
“[T]he belief-generative power of culture feed[s] on itself” resulting in the 
likelihood of increasingly insular groups that are ever-more polarized.179  
The cultural cognition thesis is not without its critics. Dr. Sander van der Linden 
is a noted scholar and critic of viewing the cultural cognition thesis as the end-all 
guidepost for how to educate the public about climate change.180 One of the 
significant claims made by Kahan is that who qualifies as an “expert” is in the eye 
of the beholder. For example, a preacher may be an expert in all things to a particular 
person—including climate change—given that person’s cultural worldview 
typology and cultural frames. So, the thought experiment goes, that person will 
refuse to recognize the value of “scientific consensus” regarding climate change 
because scientists are not the experts they trust. Van der Linden disputes this claim 
and points to empirical studies showing the existence of scientific consensus as 
having a neutralizing effect on the politically polarized worldviews.181 
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Dr. van der Linden also makes the broader critique that “in studying human 
behaviour, many explanations can and are likely to be simultaneously true. A more 
nuanced perspective that carefully integrates—rather than polarizes—well-
established theories to evaluate what works, when, for whom, and in what 
context . . . .”182 Finally, van der Linden argues that cultural cognition suffers from 
the fact that much of it is “sourced from western, educated, industrialized, rich, and 
democratic (WEIRD) populations, which has led to narrow views of both human 
culture and the sorts of communication strategies that are effective in practice.”183  
We make bad predictions by using heuristics to inform our understanding of 
the world we are trying to predict. We are influenced heavily by our own 
memories—our stories—in deciding what is and is not true. We see the world, 
subconsciously, through a veil of our own pre-existing cultural lens. We shape what 
we think is true and how risky something is based on how we see ourselves as 
members of a particular group. The empirical data from the findings point to no clear 
answers for advocates to deploy in shaping public policy or informing public 
opinion. There is one thread that links them all—the idea that people need a way to 
make an abstract concept concrete and personal while not threatening their core 
concepts of self-identification and culture. The most recent, salient, pervasive, and 
personal event for most Americans is the Subprime Mortgage Crisis. Using it as the 
frame for contextualizing the Climate Crisis presents a possible method for making 
people feel the consequences of inaction that connects to their cultural outlook. 
 
IV.  THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS 
 
The “tsunami” that has defined the recent era of American political economy is 
the Subprime Mortgage Crisis. This Part examines that crisis through the lenses of 
prediction, narrative, and cognition. Because the Subprime Mortgage Crisis is 
technical, complex, and subject to specialized knowledge in the fields of economics, 
finance, risk management, and others, some background is necessary. Of course, 
there is little to no agreement about the actual causes—likely due to (as described 
earlier) the cognitive biases of the individuals telling the story.184 But this Article 
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will attempt to sidestep the weeds of those debates by focusing on analyzing the 
problem of prediction and the accompanying narratives. 
It started with mortgages offered to, and applied for by, borrowers that were 
not ideal candidates for home loans—i.e., subprime.185 Approved borrowers had 
many traits but were viewed as high risk, and the interest rate provided to them 
attempted to reflect that enhanced risk.186 Most subprime loans were adjustable-rate 
mortgages (ARMs).187 ARMs shift the risk of rate variation from the lending entity 
to the borrower. “Many borrowers obtained ARMs under the impression that they 
would be able to refinance at favorable terms before rising interest rates triggered 
the ARMs to reset.”188 Lending standards declined and entities expanded their use 
of the “infamous” NINJA loan, which “stood for ‘No income, no job, no assets,’ 
which meant that a potential borrower did not need to show any proof of income or 
assets in order to qualify for a loan—she merely needed to state her income and 
assets.”189 
In addition, the participants involved in the process of finding, applying for, 
and obtaining a mortgage increased. Enter the mortgage broker. “Mortgage brokers 
act as intermediaries between lenders and borrowers, and for a fee, help connect 
borrowers with various lenders that may provide a wider selection of mortgage 
products. In 2006, brokerages accounted for 58 percent of total origination 
activity.”190 All in all, subprime loans “represented over 20 percent of total 
loan-origination volume” at roughly 2.8 million home loans originated—a 
significant increase from 2001 when less than one million subprime loans were 
originated.191  
A lot of subprime home loans were provided to people. This was potentially 
problematic but not necessarily ruinous to the American and world economy. 
Securitization of the mortgage industry, including subprime loans, exacerbated what 
was at stake. “Generally, securitization is ‘the aggregation and pooling of assets with 
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similar characteristics in such a way that investors may purchase interests or 
securities backed by those assets.’”192 This allows assets to be “acquired, classified 
into pools, and offered as collateral for third-party investment.”193 Applied to the 
mortgage industry, an investment bank may purchase mortgages from an originator, 
pool the purchased loans, and separate out cash flows from the underlying mortgages 
into securities with tranches representing various levels of risk.194 An exacerbation 
of this problem came in the form of incentivizing the selling off of mortgages to 
other entities, such that the initial “lenders did not have to live with the credit 
consequences of their loans.”195 The arranger responsible for structuring these 
securities organizes them this way so that investors may purchase different tiers, 
which are rated by credit rating agencies.196  
The credit rating agencies are an essential player in the crisis.197 Rating agencies 
emerged as indispensable players in the federal regulatory system because of the 
designation Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organization (NRSRO).198 
Because federal regulations included “incentives for broker-dealers to hold debt that 
has received an investment-grade rating from at least two NRSROs and some 
regulated investors are limited to investing in securities rated investment-grade, 
obtaining this designation can be very valuable and profitable to any credit rating 
agency.”199 In addition, it goes without saying that the credit agency’s rating is relied 
upon by investors.200  
The “big three” credit rating agencies—Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and 
Fitch—are the most important here.201 They also “dominated the field early on by 
being designated as NRSROs by the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . in 
1975.”202 As of today, the SEC designates just ten agencies as NRSROs.203 The 
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development of the regulatory oversight of securities incorporated the NRSROs and 
relied upon their ratings—the NRSROs became a part of the federal regulatory 
structure.204 In short, the ratings agencies continued to rate these mortgage backed 
securities (MBSs) and other collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) highly (i.e., not 
risky), despite the readily observable increase in foreclosure rates among subprime 
mortgage borrowers.205 Credit rating agencies had a variety of reasons not to 
downgrade securities that they had previously rated highly.206 
Because this Article focuses on predictions, uncertainty, and risk, Professor 
Antony Page nicely summarizes the principle aspect of the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis at issue: “Risk, largely unobserved and linked to sub-prime mortgages and 
derivative securities that were based on them, built up in the financial system.”207  
 
A.  Systematic Failure, Uncorrelated Risk Assessment 
 
A catastrophic failure of prediction.208 
 
Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz contends that the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis occurred due to “system failure,” defined as “when not just a single decision, 
but a cascade of decisions, produces a tragic result.”209 The concern, of course, with 
subprime mortgages is default. Borrowers might be ambitious and make a bad bet 
that either (1) home prices will continue to increase or (2) they will be able to 
refinance before the loan adjusts. Or borrowers might be (1) deceived by mortgage 
brokers or (2) unaware of the terms and associated risks of the ARM loan. 
Regardless of where the blame lies, borrowers’ lives will be negatively impacted by 
their own default. Their neighbors’ lives might be impacted in an indirect way by 
suffering a decrease in their fair-market-value home price.210 Perhaps the community 
suffers by losing a member due to the borrower having to relocate. But the 
consequences of a single mortgage borrower defaulting are potentially very local; it 
certainly could not be described as “system failure.” However, as the world knows 
all too well now, a narrowly confined and small-scale disruption is definitely not 
what resulted.  
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The leveraging of securities upon borrowers successfully paying their mortgage 
or refinancing in time to avoid default is what turned what could have been a local 
problem into a global problem. If one loan failed, a lot of other things were stacked 
on top of that loan. In addition, the failure of one borrower to pay her mortgage 
might be viewed as an isolated incident—bad luck for that person. Perhaps she lost 
her job. It is this inquiry—why the borrower defaulted—that Silver discusses in 
detail as a primary flaw in the credit rating agencies’ assessment of risk.  
Silver lists the mistakes that lead to bad predictions triggering the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis—which also underlie all bad predictions: (1) focus on “signals” that 
conform to our preexisting view of the world, (2) ignoring of difficult-to-ascertain 
risks even when they “pose the greatest threat to our well-being,” (3) use of 
shorthand to estimate and assume facts that are not true, and (4) strong disfavor of 
the existence of uncertainty.211 Silver recounts Standard and Poor’s (S&P’s) advice 
to investors: “when [S&P’s] rated a [CDO] at AAA, there was only a 0.12 percent 
probability—about 1 chance in 850—that it would fail to pay out over the next five 
years.”212 Silver found that, “[i]n fact, around 28 percent of the AAA-rated CDOs 
defaulted, according to S&P’s internal figures . . . [which] means that the actual 
default rates for CDOs were more than two hundred times higher than S&P had 
predicted.”213  
The head of S&P, Deven Sharma, told Congress that “nobody saw it 
coming.”214 Sharma was wrong. Michael Lewis’s book, The Big Short, details 
several people that did see the inherent problems and risky nature of these newly 
created MBSs and CDOs.215 What did they do that the big three agencies did not do, 
or did not want to do?  
Silver, legal scholars, and economists have all commented on the inherent 
conflicts of interest that lie at the base of the credit rating agencies’ interaction with 
investment banks and their influence on the ratings that they provide.216 At base, 
Silver contends that the models used by the agencies viewed the risk level of each 
tranche of a CDO as uncorrelated with the others. Back to the previous subprime 
borrower who defaulted, if she defaulted because she lost her job, that is one thing. 
Bad luck: a one-off event that has no bearing on the likelihood of default by the other 
subprime borrowers. “But suppose instead that there is some common factor that 
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bubble that has caused home prices to rise by 80 percent without any tangible 
improvement in the fundamentals.”217 The ramifications of this are major. “Now 
you’ve got trouble: if one borrower defaults, the rest might succumb to the same 
problems.”218  
The Subprime Mortgage Crisis had a fair share of people who saw bad news 
coming—they saw the tide recede and the water begin to foam, and they took high 
cover. Some of them also made a mint. People like Meredith Whitney,219 Steve 
Eisman,220 and Michael Burry221—all of whom are well-documented in the Lewis’s 
The Big Short—and Nouriel Roubini.222 Many of them may have anticipated that the 
subprime mortgage loans would fail at great numbers, well beyond what the credit 
rating agencies predicted, but they could not have foreseen the shock waves that 
reached across the globe and into communities big and small. The scope, in other 
words, of the coming damage was difficult to predict, precisely because of the degree 
of complexity built into the financial system. Securitization bred this complexity and 
multiplied it through multilayered leveraging.  
Taleb’s book, The Black Swan, was published amid the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis, but it is well-documented that he, like other main players in Lewis’s book, 
shorted the market and made a significant sum of money.223 A fundamental question 
is whether the Subprime Mortgage Crisis qualifies as a Black Swan event. For Taleb, 
the answer is easy—as is often the case.224 No, the financial crisis was a “white 
swan.”225 Taleb goes much farther than Silver in criticizing the models used in the 
context of subprime loans and CDOs: “[t]he system used to analyze risk is 
completely defective, and actually could not keep up with the complexity of the 
financial products that are involved.”226 Because of the complexity of the system, 
and the failure to understand it, and the usage of oversimplified and narrow modeling 
practices, Taleb posits that these models provide a false sense of security by 
measuring the “known” and blinding us to the unknown—which will necessarily be 
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absolutely devastating to the system.227 The propagation of these models by persons 
or entities entitles them to one of Taleb’s favorite labels: “intellectual charlatans.”228 
The models, predictions, and data that served the industry all, in some fashion, 
expected home prices to continue to appreciate. Subprime borrowers either (1) 
shared that assumption or (2) did not realize that they needed to share that 
assumption. Professor Steven Schwarcz has said that “[t]he failure of subprime 
mortgage securitization was thus caused by its almost absolute dependence on home 
appreciation.”229 To use Taleb’s allegory, everyone acted like turkeys. Moreover, 
they thought that the past few years of home appreciation would serve as an accurate 
prediction of the future, à la Mediocristan. Instead, in March 2008, the American 
economy contained an estimated 8.8 million homeowners—almost 11 percent of all 
homeowners—who had zero or negative equity in their homes.230 Two years later, 
unemployment had doubled,231 and there was a record number of homes 
foreclosed—more than one million.232 Thanksgiving Day had come, and we 
“incur[red] a revision of belief”233 about our world.  
 
B.  Narrative Coherence in Economic Ruin 
 
We focus on those signals that tell a story about the world as we would 
like it to be, not how it really is.234 
 
Ever since the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, we have tried to explain it and 
understand it. An important narrative that arose in its aftermath consists of four 
simple words: “too big to fail.” 
The phrase “too big to fail” denotes “a firm that has become so large that the 
government cannot afford to let it fail because the consequences of its failure would 
be too severe.”235 The term recognizes and incorporates the vast leveraging that 
occurs in the financial sector as well as the systemic nature of finance. Stemming 
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from this concept is one that is equally important as a narrative: moral hazard.236 
Professor Mark Roe has explained it nicely: 
 
As is now well known, big financial firm managers have reason to accept 
otherwise too-large risks in too-big-to-fail financial firms: If the risk pays 
off, shareholders gain and managers get big bonuses. If the risk turns out 
badly, then shareholders and other financiers of the firm are unhappy, but 
the government will bail out many of them. This makes the downside for 
a too-big-to-fail financial firm not as unpleasant as it would be for a typical 
industrial firm, which would have to file for bankruptcy when a major risk 
turns out badly.237 
 
These narratives are inherently coupled, and more importantly, they are not new 
in the United States.238 Of course, other narratives exist. From the political right, the 
blame is laid squarely at the feet of big federal government involvement in the 
financial markets.239 Others have the view that there is plenty of blame to go 
around.240 Or, this entire crisis may be so complicated that, as the narrator in the film 
version of The Big Short says about it and public understanding, “I’m guessing most 
of you still don’t know what really happened. Yeah, you’ve got a soundbite that you 
repeat so you don’t sound dumb, but c’mon.”241 The film acknowledges the idea that 
the complexity and abstraction inherent in the crisis is so foreign and difficult that it 
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uses brief vignettes of celebrity cameos to explain certain important terms, like 
subprime, CDOs, and leverage.242 These serve the purpose of making the narrative 
comprehensible.  
The question becomes which narrative of fault and the predictability (or not) of 
failure is most compatible with our American nomos. There will be many answers 
to that, which likely depend on various factors such as political party affiliation, 
income level, geography, etc. But the narrative most likely to take hold will be one 
that resonates with individuals personally, via their experience in their nomos, to use 
Cover’s term. The narrative must be congruent with that world or it will be 
discarded. The data, numbers, and statistics involved in the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis serve to disassociate most people from the event. They are abstractions unless 
they resonate with that person—unless they are one of the unemployed or the 
foreclosed upon. If they are not, an alternative narrative takes hold and compels a 
different course of conduct consistent with that worldview. The question of which 
narrative has taken hold in the United States is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Moreover, it is likely that there are multiple narratives. The fractured view of the 
crisis, fault, and prediction impacts the legal and political response. If constituents 
are demanding different things because of their conception of the story of the crisis, 
then there will be a lack of clarity with respect to the objectives to be accomplished 
by any legal-reform efforts.  
Narrative is essential to responding to a crisis while it is occurring, or preferably 
before it occurs. Without the narrative, the data alone does not demand human 
attention and action. But the narrative can shift from group to group, emphasizing 
different aspects of the events that comport with the listener’s cultural outlook. The 
absence of a clear narrative breeds confusion and collective action problems and 
leaves a vacuum able to be filled by entities designed to create doubt. A clear and 
simple narrative, based on data, which connects with people’s nomos and culture is 
instrumental in addressing crisis. 
 
V.  THE CLIMATE CRISIS 
 
The hard science underlying anthropogenic climate change is much easier to 
understand than how a mortgage bond security is created. Also, in contrast to the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, everyone agrees that (1) climate change is occurring, 
and (2) we are the cause of it.243 As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
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(IPCC) 244 stated, “[h]uman influence on the climate system is clear. This is evident 
from the increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, positive 
radiative forcing, observed warming, and understanding of the climate system.”245 
Furthermore, “It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant 
cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.”246  
 
A.  Hard Science 
 
Anthropogenic climate change is focused only on certain gases released into 
the atmosphere: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, water vapor, and other man-
made gases like chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).247 When these gases are 
emitted into the atmosphere they “allow direct sunlight (relative shortwave energy) 
to reach the Earth’s surface unimpeded.”248 This shortwave energy heats the surface 
and “longer-wave (infrared) energy (heat) is reradiated to the atmosphere.”249 The 
“greenhouse gases” absorb this longer-wave energy and prevent heat from the 
Earth’s surface from returning to space.250 It is contained in the lower atmosphere.251  
The primary greenhouse gas at issue is carbon dioxide since humans produce 
so much of it. Once carbon dioxide is dispersed into the air, “it is repartitioned 
among the atmosphere, the ocean, and the near-surface materials of the land. That 
portion that remains in the atmosphere causes global warming and other forms of 
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climate disruption, while that portion that enters the ocean causes ocean 
acidification.”252 Another reason to focus on carbon dioxide is that it stays in the 
atmosphere far longer than other greenhouse gases.253 In contrast, methane, which is 
more potent, has an atmospheric life of only ten to twelve years.254 Therefore, given 
that (1) humans produce a significant amount of carbon dioxide, (2) carbon dioxide 
is the most prominent greenhouse gas, and (3) it has the longest atmospheric 
lifespan, it is the focus of nearly all climate change mitigation solutions and 
strategies.   
The Earth’s climate is habitable for humans, but it is fragile—much like the 
American economy. It is also complex, like the American economy, such that a 
change which may seem small, can have unanticipated and significant consequences 
which stretch across the globe. Unless we understand all the rules governing that 
complex system, tinkering with it is quite dangerous given the magnitude of 
consequences that may result. The habitable climate is analogous to the American 
economy after the securitization of subprime mortgage loans—everything depended 
on the success or failure of the underlying loans—and in the context of the Climate 
Crisis, everything depends on the reduction in the release of greenhouse gases, 
particularly carbon dioxide. This parallels the description of networked risk255 or 
systemic risk absent in so many of the predictions and models from the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis.  
 
B.  Systematic Complexity and Legal Interdependence 
 
Bedrock scientific principles hold that the range of habitable climates for 
human beings is limited and subject to change based on our actions. It is not simply 
the case that climate change will render an area of the world too hot to live in. The 
consequences of climate change go far beyond simply warming the planet to an 
uncomfortable degree. For example, the Subprime Mortgage Crisis did not just 
directly affect the defaulting subprime loan borrowers, it affected the administrative 
assistants and janitorial staff at Lehman Brothers as well as the thousands of tenants 
in foreclosed homes.256 Those consequences were the ones no one saw coming. This 
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Section examines one particular consequence that we can expect to see due to the 
failure to respond to climate change.  
The increase in global temperature already has, and will continue to have, an 
effect on water resources.257 Three primary areas of water resources will be impacted 
by temperature increase. Surface water evaporation will be enhanced.258 Snowpack 
accumulation, location, and timing will be modified.259 And weather patterns will 
change—resulting in drought intensification.260 Changes to the availability of water 
resources—groundwater, surface water, rainfall, and snowpack—shake the 
foundation of communities because the systems of water resources regulation have 
been built upon the idea of stationarity. Examining the law’s reliance on this concept 
is critical. 
Stationarity, as used here, refers to “the idea that natural systems fluctuate 
within an unchanging envelope of variability.”261 This means that any variable, like 
stream flows in a river, has a time-invariant function that allows for future planning 
to be done based on past measurements.262 Some scientists assert that, in the context 
of water management, “stationarity is dead” and anthropogenic climate change 
killed it.263 It is intuitive to see the problems that can arise when the Farmer’s 
Almanac is no longer very good at predicting rainfall for a given region. That makes 
the farmers’ jobs harder and riskier. But this idea, that stationarity is unreliable, is 
more important when water resources are placed in the context of law and regulation. 
This is because the legal system of water resources control operates to foster reliance 
in the minds of people and communities across the planet. The fostering of this 
reliance parallels the concept of leverage in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis. Since 
the past is no longer a reliable data set to utilize in planning for the future in the 
context of water resources, the indirect consequences have an undefined reach and 
degree. 
The changes that come with temperature increase are bad enough by 
themselves. Indeed, the water-climate nexus is another example of how leveraged 
our climate is. But the effects are exacerbated when they are situated within the legal 
context of water resources use and regulation. Thus, you have physical problems 
and legal problems. All water resources are subject to some degree of state, federal, 
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or tribal sovereign control.264 Water law is generally divided into two categories: 
surface water and groundwater. Each category is subject to potentially different rules 
regarding ownership and use of the water resource.265 For surface water, a typical 
state uses either riparian principles from English common law266 or the doctrine of 
prior appropriation from American common law as legal structures.267 Furthermore, 
water law generally exists within the realm of state law.268 Even where the 
watercourse, like the Mississippi River, traverses multiple states, each sovereign has 
the authority to regulate that portion of the river running through its boundaries. The 
same goes for groundwater aquifers—like the Ogallala Aquifer, which underlies 
eight states—where water located in a common underground pool will be subject to 
different legal and regulatory structures.269 This fact of state regulatory control over 
common-pool resources (CPRs) already produces difficulties in the context of 
regulating a watercourse sustainably. One jurisdiction may have a different view of 
what amount of water may be diverted without undermining the long-term supply 
of water in the watercourse. However, this is a problem symptomatic of regulating 
all CPRs.270  
The fundamental problem with water law is that it imposes an inflexible 
property-rights regime on an inherently variable resource. It attempts to create 
certainty out of uncertainty. This presents problems that water-scarce areas already 
understand all too well. Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, the first person to 
put water to a beneficial use obtains a property right in the continuation of that use 
in the amount actually used.271 So long as it is used beneficially, that right may not 
be abridged absent eminent domain, prescription, or abandonment or forfeiture. The 
same goes for a riparian landowner’s use of water; as long as no harm is caused to 
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other riparian owners, the use may continue.272 These concepts are rooted in real 
property law—the use and enjoyment of property and the bundle of entitlements that 
come with ownership. Those property entitlements work perfectly well in the 
context of land, which does not move, evaporate, or cease to exist if sufficient 
rainfall or snowmelt does not materialize.  
The implicit and well-founded assumption is that each morning when a real 
property owner wakes up and looks out her window, her property will still be there. 
The structure functions nicely by setting clear bright lines and well-defined rights 
that are separable and alienable. This, however, is not the actual state of things in 
the context of water resources. Perhaps such an approach functioned well in the 
water plentiful eastern United States, but not so in the West where water is scarcer. 
The problem of water scarcity that westerners have grown up with is exacerbated by 
anthropogenic climate change. Uncertainty about the quantity and timing of rainfall 
and snowpack increases with climate change magnifying the inherent flaws in the 
property-rights structure applied to water resources. The legal paradigm for control 
and regulation of water resources is built upon the property-rights paradigm. This is 
leverage; and the measure of the indirect negative consequences is hard to fathom, 
akin to the indirect and severe consequences which stemmed from the defaulting 
subprime borrowers.  
In the context of climate change, the nexus for the existence of a reliable water 
supply, food security, reliable weather patterns, and human health is Earth’s 
habitable climate. In prior work, I described certain watercourses and aquifers as a 
type of CPR. I have written about certain types of CPRs that warrant special 
attention, called vital commons.273 The Earth’s habitable climate is a vital commons. 
A vital commons is one in which:  
 
1) the benefits of the CPR are internalized by nearly all members of a given 
massive population; 2) the costs of the CPR’s depletion are externalized 
among nearly all members of that same massive population; 3) 
augmentation or depletion of the CPR by one party affects the ability to 
use the CPR by another party within the same massive population; 4) the 
CPR itself is necessary for sustenance; and 5) damage or depletion of the 
CPR is non-remediable or extremely difficult to correct.274  
 
The habitable climate meets the above definition. Garrett Hardin’s iconic work, 
The Tragedy of the Commons, provides a helpful and clear illustration.275 Imagine a 
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common pasture used by a number of ranchers.276 Each person lets her cattle graze 
on the pasture.277 When a rancher adds a cow, she internalizes the benefit of that 
addition because she is able to sell the cow and claim the profit.278 This 
simultaneously imposes a cost on the pasture by reducing the grass available for 
consumption.279 She certainly bears some of that cost but so do all other ranchers in 
equal share.280 The cost she imposes by adding the cow is externalized to the 
community.281 Hardin claims that the economically rational action—adding cows—
necessarily means ruin for the common pasture.282  
Harold Demsetz argued that in the above commons example the regime of 
private-property rights solves the problem of exhausting common pool resources.283 
Private property solves the tragedy of the commons by conferring the right to 
exclude among all members of the former commons.284 In theory, Demsetz asserts 
that landowners will want to preserve the natural resource for their future 
generations and use it in accordance with that goal.285 They will not allow neighbors 
to use their scarce resource; instead, they will manage it prudently to ensure 
sustainable use.286 Whether this idea is born out in CPRs generally is not the inquiry 
here. It is not even an option in the context of this vital commons. There is no method 
of privatizing a nation’s portion of the habitable climate. To pick up the common 
pasture example, it is as if the United States (a neighbor in the commons pasture) 
has sent a herd of cattle onto the property of Guatemala and the Guatemalans can do 
nothing about it.  
The global habitable commons is nonprivatizable. As Professor Sarah Krakoff 
has said, “[t]he atmosphere is a global commons; no matter where in the world you 
are, your emissions contribute to its increasing insulating properties.”287 She states 
that the habitable commons “cannot be compartmentalized.”288 She goes on, 
 
For example, the fact that the United States has the highest historical 
greenhouse gas emissions does not mean that our atmosphere is “thicker” 
and that we will suffer from global warming proportionately more than 
other countries. The spatial dispersion also means that reductions in one 
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part of the globe can be rendered meaningless by increases in another part 
of the globe. If the total parts per million of CO2 continue to rise overall, 
it does not matter where the parts come from. This spatial dispersion 
feature of global warming means that disparate effects from climate 
change cannot be redressed by targeting the emitters closest to the affected 
area.289 
 
In the context of Hardin’s ordinary pasture, overuse and exhaustion would force 
the population to, perhaps, move elsewhere. In contrast, overuse of the vital 
commons does not simply result in the rancher moving to the city and working at a 
factory or selling insurance. Exhaustion of the vital commons is the Climate Crisis. 
There is nowhere else—save for Mars or the Moon—for us to go.  
There are two legal responses that attempt to avoid the Climate Crisis: litigation 
and regulation. A recent and prominent case that goes directly to the challenges of 
litigation to effectively reduce carbon emissions is Native Village of Kivalina v. 
ExxonMobil Corp.290 Kivalina is a sovereign federally recognized Indian tribe 
located 625 miles northwest of Anchorage, Alaska.291 The Village is located within 
a six-and-a-half-mile barrier reef island seventy miles north of the Arctic Circle.292 
Four hundred people live there, almost all of whom are native Inupiat.293 They carry 
on the traditions of the generations that came before them, engaging in subsistence 
fishing, whaling, and hunting to sustain themselves.294 Kivalina has withstood harsh 
weather because of the sea ice formations that protect the Village from storms and 
also serve as the land upon which structures are built.295 
The sea ice is melting faster and faster in the region thereby exposing the 
Village to greater storms and an increased risk that floods will wipe out the 
Village.296 Moreover, significant erosion of the sea ice has resulted in the loss of 
land.297 In 2009, Kivalina filed a claim in federal court against a group of energy 
companies that produce carbon emissions, arguing that it constituted a public 
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nuisance.298 The District Court held that the Village lacked Article III standing 
because it “could not demonstrate either a ‘substantial likelihood’ that defendants’ 
conduct caused plaintiff’s injury nor that the ‘seed’ of its injury could be traced to 
any of the Energy Producers.”299 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of 
Kivalina’s case by holding that the Clean Air Act had preempted the Village’s federal 
common public nuisance claim.300  
Kivalina’s suit demonstrates the immense difficulty confronting plaintiffs 
seeking to directly hold carbon emitters responsible for contributions to climate 
change. Causation will always be a significant hurdle given the science of climate 
change. In addition, fashioning a remedy can be challenging. The ideal remedy 
would not amount to damages but would be calculated by reference to the 
rehabilitative costs and measures that must be undertaken to unwind the emission of 
greenhouse gases—itself a difficult scientific and technologic problem. 
The prevailing administrative and legislative approaches to protecting the 
habitable commons focuses on regulating carbon emissions. This Article is not 
focused on which solutions are the best; but all regulatory approaches seek, in some 
fashion, to price carbon based on the anticipated cost of a warmer climate on the 
future populations that must endure it. The problem, of course, is that political 
representatives must be moved by their constituents to address these concerns—
which, as demonstrated above, is why nothing has been done. Americans are not 
demanding change as there is a decided lack of urgency in their minds regarding the 
uncertainty and risk of a warmer world.  
 
C.  Predicting the End of the Anthropocene 
 
The greatest concern over the effects of climate change centers on 
uncertainty—uncertainty in when they will occur or start to occur, how grave they 
will be, and the regions to be affected by them.301 A primary source for collecting 
the various modeling on climate change is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC)—the international organization that sets out the positions of the 
scientific community.  
The IPCC has produced Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) whose 
“primary purpose is to provide time-dependent projections of atmospheric 
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greenhouse gas concentrations.”302 The RCPs will encourage conversation that 
integrate the many facets of climate change—social, economic, etc.—so that new 
literature may emerge that connects our emissions goals with humanities’ choices of 
action.303 The IPCC technical summary explains that the RCPs are intended to be 
“representative of plausible alternative scenarios for the future but are not 
predictions or forecasts of future outcomes.”304 This caveat is important—it serves 
to explain what the RCPs are doing. They function as guides to describe the range 
of plausible ramifications of carbon emissions under certain scenarios of carbon 
dioxide emissions. 
In other words, the RCPs are not akin to the credit rating agencies’ AAA rating 
which purported to make a prediction about the chance a security would fail. As 
Silver described, complex systems where the rules are not well understood are much 
more likely to produce errors when describing the future. The IPCC appears to agree 
on this point by expressly disclaiming any conception that it is predicting what will 
happen. To be sure, there are models that do try to predict temperature increase and 
sea level rise due to anthropogenic climate change, but they serve a different function 
than the RCPs. However, even those models appear to underestimate the temperature 
increase sustained by anthropogenic climate change.305 
To use Taleb’s language, the IPCC acknowledges that it is operating in 
Extremistan, and not Mediocristan. Given that the field of operation is inherently 
complex and therefore difficult to predict, one could question the value of the RCPs. 
In the context of climate models that do seek to predict, with some degree of 
specificity, temperature increase, one could argue that the great complexity and 
uncertainty about causation should compel no urgency to act immediately. However, 
Taleb himself would strongly disagree with that approach. He—and his coauthors—
argue that much of the current debate about emissions limitations wrongly focuses 
on the accuracy of warming scenarios and predictions.306 This results in opponents 
of climate change mitigation demanding proof that future events will occur exactly 
as the models predict, while proponents of emission mitigation use them as the basis 
for demanding aggressive immediate action.307 Taleb rejects the binary choice 
presented and argues that this misframes the issue. Instead, we should focus on risk 
and ask, “what would the correct policy be if we had no reliable models?”308 He 
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reasons that we have only one planet and really only one version of the planet that 
is habitable for us.309 “This fact radically constrains the kinds of risks that are 
appropriate to take at a large scale. Even a risk with a very low probability becomes 
unacceptable when it affects all of us—there is no reversing mistakes of that 
magnitude.”310  
Taleb reasons that since we understand the basic scientific principle that carbon 
dioxide “destabiliz[es] the climate” the integral nature of that resource to human life 
compels the conclusion to reduce regardless of what any model says.311 No 
prediction is necessary since the simple rule—that carbon dioxide reaches the 
atmosphere and warms the planet—is the only principle necessary to compel the 
conclusion. This avoids the complexity and error in predictions and forecasts by 
rendering them irrelevant for policy purposes. It is precisely the complexity of the 
habitable climate system that drives this heightened concern of the uncertainty 
associated with the scale of the effect. “It is the degree of opacity and uncertainty in 
a system, as well as asymmetry in effect, rather than specific model predictions, that 
should drive the precautionary measures. Push a complex system too far and it will 
not come back.”312  
The Climate Crisis is a white swan; it is foreseeable in the same way that Taleb 
viewed the Subprime Mortgage Crisis as a white swan. It is a white swan because 
the adverse consequences are dictated by simple, scientific rules that are always true. 
There is more to explain though. Professor Baradaran has stated that “it 
is . . . difficult to imagine a severe crisis when one has not occurred in the recent 
past.”313 She references the phrase “Disaster Myopia”—the idea that we have a 
“propensity to underestimate the probability of adverse outcomes, in particular small 
probability events from the distant past.”314 A habitable climate ending event is 
unimaginable, unless you are a dinosaur, therefore the application to climate change 
is apt. The research describing this problem of distance is significant and does not 
necessarily provide a clear antidote.315 Research indicates that “proximising” climate 
change—framing the effects of climate change as currently occurring rather than 
anticipated in the future—does not automatically translate into urgency to act.316 
Furthermore, proximising climate change increases the likelihood of creating fear, 
which can slow the motivation to engage in solutions.317 
This reinforces the ideas described in human cognition and the lessons learned 
from Kahneman, Tversky, Kahan, and van der Linden. Ultimately, and in a variety 
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of contexts, “[T]ime is at the heart of understanding climate change.”318 The 
challenge is undoing Disaster Myopia; except it is so ingrained in our psychology. 
“The human brain developed in a time when humans were largely concerned with 
their direct environment (e.g., foraging for food) and immediate dangers (e.g., from 
predators).”319 We are evolutionarily conditioned to focus on emphasizing “short-
term consequences of behavior and immediate futures.”320 Furthermore, 
“psychological discounting” research shows that we place less value on events that 
occur in the future as opposed to in the present.321 This is particularly true of our 
perceptions of future environmental consequences.322  
I argue that while there is no clear-cut empirically supported theory of the magic 
bullet for climate communication, some harmony may be achieved in stitching 
together these pieces of research. Fundamentally, this is about improving science 
communication around the concepts of risk, harm, and uncertainty. Except the 
communication should not focus on those aspects of climate change. Instead, the 
development of an appropriate narrative could facilitate the conception of the world 
in a manner consistent with the scientific understanding of climate change risk. The 
narrative could function in two ways: first, it could operate to challenge the 
longstanding perceptions of the world thereby resulting in a change of the 
individual’s behavior or, second, the salience of the narrative could replace the 
preexisting conceptions of the world with different and more recent stories that 
compel action rather than inaction.  
We know that reading about a house burning down will be less effective in 
compelling the purchase of fire insurance than watching your neighbor’s house burn 
down. This is the availability heuristic described by Tversky and Kahneman. But, 
the availability heuristic dovetails with Disaster Myopia. Generations of people have 
only the memory of a world that, while it fluctuates in temperature, is never too hot 
to live in. Therefore, the easiest memories to recall are ones that tell us everything 
will be fine. They create an expectation that things will be correct to the norm in the 
future—because that is the way the world has always worked. In addition, one 
particular person’s experience (even a multigenerational one) is an example of 
Tversky and Kahneman’s Law of Small Numbers. Take, for example, a theoretical 
rural community predominantly engaged in the practice of farming or ranching. The 
rural farmer within the community is one sample. His neighbors do not really operate 
to broaden the sample. His experience and his beliefs are representative of the 
experience of most other people. The other farmers do not really function to broaden 
the sample size in any statistically significant way. In the scope of the global 
population, these “random samples” the farmer contacts—local farmers—all have 
similar experiences. This compels the belief that their experience—of an incredibly 
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and nonrepresentative small sample size—is attributable to the much larger 
population of people, including those in Kivalina whose houses are falling into the 
ocean. The idea that Kivalina might be falling into the ocean is incomprehensible to 
them given their heuristic biases. But this is not their perception; it is inconsistent 
with everything they know to be true about the world. This is the availability 
heuristic at work. His experience is closest to him, easiest to recall, and most 
prominent in his mind.  
 
D.  Solutions and Narrative 
 
[T]he highest use and greatest facility of narrative is as an iconoclastic 
tool of persuasion to legal and social change.323 
 
The need for a narrative is clear. As Taleb states—albeit condescendingly so—
it allows us to understand (or at least have the illusion of understanding) our world 
and surroundings.324 The Climate Crisis is based on hard science and the simple rule 
that carbon dioxide stays in the atmosphere and warms the earth. But the climate-
change narrative is defined by high-level mathematics, forecasting, and scientific 
principles. We know that there is a problem with scientific communication. A 
significant portion of the population is not science-literate or math-literate, let alone 
able to understand (or interested in) an explanation of Bayesian statistical theory. 
Although the scientific principles underlying the Climate Crisis are clear and simple, 
their adverse ramifications are complex, systemic, multilayered, and—in some 
respects—uncertain. In other words, the consequences of the Climate Crisis will be 
bad. But we do not know how bad they will be, and we cannot exactly forecast when 
and where they will be that bad. This psychological distance compounds the 
difficulty in translating the risks to the public.  
Part of the problem lies in the fact that the current narrative concerning climate 
is defined by (1) statistics, data, and numbers or (2) the distant future will be terrible. 
Both concepts are as abstract as legal principles like the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
What the scientists are telling us—that our planet is in grave danger—directly 
contradicts our current understanding of the world as well as our learned experience 
up to this point—our nomos and heuristics. Our nomos leaves no room for the 
possibility that the world would end, even gradually so, like a frog perishing in a pot 
of increasingly boiling water. Disaster Myopia certainly captures this idea. 
Furthermore, our evolutionary development has conditioned us to prioritize short-
term consequences. Even if people can properly weigh the long-term risks, there is 
no narrative for the extinction-level circumstance on Earth—that memory is not 
available to us. In simplified parabolic form, we are all turkeys and the butcher has 
not yet come for us. In addition, this country has experienced a variety of purported 
world-ending crises—such as the depletion of the ozone layer and the gas crisis of 
the late 1970s and 1980s. All those so-called crises turned out not to be crises at all. 
                                               
323 Winter, supra note 127, at 2228. 
324 TALEB, supra note 30, at xxvii. 
428 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
Much of the population may adhere to the narrative that scientists cry wolf a lot, and 
why should we believe them now?  
Steven Pinker has said that “narratives without statistics are blind, [and] 
statistics without narratives are empty.”325 We need a clear narrative, relatable to as 
many people as possible. The research described presents a series of conflicting, 
overlapping, and interrelated findings that prevent the identification of a single 
narrative. We do not need more facts in communicating climate change. No more 
stories about polar bears and Arctic sea ice. No more charts about the dangers of a 
two-degree Celsius increase in temperature. Because we know that when someone 
hears that the climate is getting warmer, they think, “Great, I hate the cold!” or, “I 
guess I’ll wear shorts in early March instead of jeans.” The actual amount of increase 
in degrees makes matters worse because it seems inconsequential to the average 
person. Many Americans are not necessarily science literate enough to understand 
the consequences to the water-climate-food nexus of that increase in temperature. 
Plus, under Kahan’s Cultural Cognition Thesis, it does not matter—what matters is 
their collective identity adoption.  
Kahan set out to test these various explanations of why people do not perceive 
the risks of climate change. Does improving science literacy aid in moving an 
individual to believe in climate change? Does preventing the operation of heuristics 
make it more likely that an individual will believe in climate change? Or is it all 
dependent upon whether an individual’s cultural identity group believes in it? In 
Kahan’s empirical work, the results demonstrate that when science literacy is 
improved—meaning that respondents are able to articulate and comprehend the 
scientific basis for climate change—respondents’ concern over the risks of climate 
change decreased.326 The same was true when respondents were tested on the basis 
of the operation of heuristics—as respondents decreased reliance on heuristics, the 
perception of the risks of climate change also decreased.327 However, when Kahan 
tested the cultural cognition thesis, there was a clear correlation along the cultural 
worldview typology developed by Douglas. Those with “Low Grid and High Group” 
typologies believed climate change was a significant concern while those with “High 
Grid and Low Group” typologies did not.328 Kahan’s ultimate recommendation 
concerns the “science of science communication.” In conveying messaging about 
climate change, scientists have done the data and predictions well, but the messaging 
should be mindful of the cultural barriers that exist among individuals.329  
In light of all this, it makes sense then, that the average member of the public 
does not immediately go out and buy LED bulbs, finance a Tesla Model S, and call 
a solar panel installation company. People care about themselves. Moreover, they 
care about themselves now. There is no perceived urgency and even if things will be 
very bad in the future, we worry about that then. We must focus on what people are 
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moved by. That is an incredibly difficult question to answer, but it is essential to our 
survival. This is a problem of advocacy, not of legal solution-making, regulatory 
drafting, or technological innovation. The challenge concerns how to resonate with 
people in order to move them to change. Whatever legal and regulatory mechanism 
is employed, they all function similarly—to force carbon emissions producers/users 
to internalize the costs of carbon emissions that are currently externalized to the 
globe and future global inhabitants. What helps us in developing an advocacy 
strategy is that we know a great deal about attitudes concerning climate change.  
The Yale Program on Communication and Climate Change (YPCC) provides 
vast amounts of data about American attitudes concerning climate change.330 The 
YPCC “conduct[s] scientific research on public climate change knowledge, 
attitudes, policy preferences, and behavior at the global, national, and local 
scales.”331 A primary contribution to the narrative on climate change stems from the 
YPCC’s project on the “Six Americas.”332 This study sought to understand the 
audience receiving the information about climate change.333 Six groups exist within 
the United States, at one end of the spectrum are “Alarmed” people who are 
convinced climate change is occurring and harmful and support aggressive action to 
mitigate its effects.334 On the other end are “Dismissive” people who either do not 
believe it is a problem or believe that it is a hoax.335 In between those two groups are 
the remaining four, “Concerned,” “Cautious,” “Disengaged,” and “Doubtful.”336 
These groups “are strongly associated with a range of characteristics, including 
climate and energy beliefs and policy preferences; political ideology and party 
identification; cultural values; political efficacy, and consumer and political 
behavior.”337 The challenge is moving people from the “doubtful,” “disengaged,” 
and “cautious” categories into positions where they are engaged, demand change 
from governmental entities, and implement changes themselves. 
The project makes recommendations for various groups to facilitate 
engagement. For the “alarmed” and “concerned” groups since “[t]hey are already 
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strongly convinced of the reality and danger of climate change, . . . strong arguments 
on these topics aren’t needed; they need instead well-reasoned information on 
solutions that are both feasible and effective.”338 In focusing on the “disengaged” 
and “cautious” groups, the study found that both groups pay less attention to the 
news about global warming but have questions about the existence and 
consequences of climate change.339 Connecting with these groups through the news 
media and answering their questions is unlikely, given their lack of interaction with 
news sources. 
In response to these “low involvement” groups, the YPCC makes certain 
recommendations.340 The YPCC notes that these “audience members are unlikely to 
pay attention if understanding the content requires cognitive effort,” thereby 
emphasizing the importance of messaging and doing the cognitive work for them.341 
A key recommendation and method to accomplish this is to “generate involvement 
through the use of narratives.”342 The program emphasizes the value in showing 
rather than telling the individual about climate change and its effects.343 In showing 
these effects, the communicator should seek to “personalize the threat” to the viewer 
by connecting climate change with places that are “physically close” or “emotionally 
significant.”344 The YPCC summarizes the benefits of deploying these approaches 
across all segments of the Six Americas, “we are all influenced by social norms, we 
become emotionally engaged with compelling narratives, are drawn to attractive 
sources, and process visual information effortlessly and instantly.”345 We need less 
facts, data, and cognitive intensive explanation and more stories that pull at heart 
strings and connect at a local level. 
 
E.  The Paris Accord and the United States 2016 Election 
 
In the aftermath of Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States, 
he has decided to withdraw the United States from participating in the Paris 
Agreement.346 The YPCC found that nearly seven out of ten registered voters in the 
United States supported U.S. participation in international climate agreements such 
as the Paris Accord.347 Climate change is not an issue that drives the voting 
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preferences of individuals—clearly. If it were, then Mr. Trump would not have won 
the 2016 election, and the candidate advocating for broad and clearly defined action 
on climate change would have. In the abstract, seven of ten registered voters may 
support mitigation of climate change, but when that issue is thrown into the mix of 
other political matters like taxes, job creation, women’s rights, foreign affairs, 
terrorism, or crime, it may no longer be the driver of political preference in elections. 
Part of why this may be the case has to do with narrative. Recall that the YPCC 
found that only a small percentage of Americans felt that they were experiencing 
climate change—personally.348  
Many Americans see climate change as a distant problem because they are not 
negatively affected by it or do not realize that they are being affected by it. Therefore, 
there must be a personal and present connection between the person and climate 
change in order for it to drive political preferences and engagement. The most 
effective means to get people thinking about climate change have recently occurred 
in Arizona, which experienced record-setting high temperatures.349 Flights are 
canceled or delayed due to extreme heat, which is an effect of climate change.350 The 
power of inconvenience to motivate business persons needing to attend a client 
meeting or parents of excited children waiting to go on vacation cannot be 
understated.351  
Of course, the late summer of 2017 has brought us events that reach well-
beyond the inconvenience of missing a flight or replacing a trash can. Houston was 
ravaged by a hurricane, flooding, and deluge. Less than a month later, the Caribbean 
was ravaged by another hurricane before it made its way to South Florida. In the 
following weeks, forest fires devastated Northern California. These are all good 
examples of the consequences of climate change. Warmer global temperatures result 
in warmer ocean water which contributes to increased strength of hurricanes.352 
Forest fires increase in likelihood during extended droughts, brought on by changing 
weather patterns and the increased temperature. There are scientific correlations to 
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draw between these disasters and global warming. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that those connections are intuitive for the rest of the population. 
The rest of the population may simply say, “Yes, we’ve had hurricanes before, forest 
fires have happened throughout history, and this is simply part of the natural cycle.” 
This is an example of people taking pieces of evidence and construing them so as to 




In the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, the economic collapse showed the systemic 
fragility that exists in complex interdependent systems. The legislative response to 
that “tsunami” echoed the commentary from previous economic crises—some 
entities are “too big to fail” and warrant a government bailout. The “‘too big to fail’ 
problem extends to any system that depends on everything being predictable.”353 In 
those systems, like the way we have constructed the legal/physical and climate/water 
interdependence, “external events or small errors by decisionmakers can be 
catastrophic when they have effects for which the system’s structure does not 
account.”354 Our system of water rights is based on stationarity, certainty, and 
assumes that water will continue to flow. These assumptions are no longer well-
founded or appropriate given the “external event” of climate change. The very idea 
that our way of life will continue undisturbed in a generally predictable manner, just 
as in the past, is similarly unfounded. 
At some point, there will be a recalibration. It may not be linear—like the drastic 
revision of belief experienced by the turkey on the day before Thanksgiving. Instead, 
it may be more like the harm being done to the traditional Inupiat people in the 
Village of Kivalina. Their way of life stretches back hundreds and hundreds of years, 
well before Christopher Columbus got lost. It is ending, and it is ending through no 
fault of their own. It is ending because the habitable climate is a global commons, 
and they could not prevent carbon emitters from exhausting the Villages’ lifeways.  
If the village of Kivalina does not move—the cost of the move is estimated at 
anywhere from $100–$400 million355—it will end the lives of those who do not 
leave. “There is no means to leave the island on foot or by vehicle during a storm, 
and transport by boat or plane in storm conditions would be dangerous.”356 At some 
point, during a storm, the sea will rise up and take them away, and along with it their 
traditional knowledge and indigenous culture. As an indigenous person, I view 
this—consistent with the YPCC’s recommendation to develop narratives that hit 
close to home emotionally—as happening to me and my community. The pictures 
of the children on the island are my children, the elders are my elders, and the 
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indigenous lifeways are those of the Chickasaw people who have demonstrated 
resilience and endurance against significant obstacles for centuries. Instead of sea 
ice falling into the ocean, for us, it is the perpetuation of drought in southern 
Oklahoma, increased tornado activity, public health effects and deaths due to 
extreme heat exposure, and an increase in the cost of sustenance because of the 
fragility of the food-water nexus.  
As a legal scholar interested in policy, I reiterate the concern of a noted 
journalist: “If we can’t figure out how to save a village with fewer than 600 people 
from falling into the sea, what hope is there for everyone else?”357 It strikes at the 
core of narrative power. Adaptation cannot be our only plan to address the Climate 
Crisis because we will underestimate the effects, the costs, and the losses. In this 
way, our underestimation of the adverse effects of climate change, the Climate Crisis 
parallels the Subprime Mortgage Crisis. In other ways, the two crises diverge.  
While the failure of the habitable commons certainly falls into the category of 
things that are “too big to fail,” it differs from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
response in one important way: there is no bailout for the Climate Crisis. They 
diverge because the expenditure of taxpayer money cannot restore the habitable 
commons in the manner that the government bailout attempted to rehabilitate the 
American economy and mitigate the job losses felt by thousands and thousands of 
people. These two crises converge when comparing carbon emission producers—
primarily the fossil fuel energy sector and transportation—with the mortgage 
brokers making NINJA loans to borrowers. The brokers off-load the risk of 
defaulting loans on others, while the carbon emission producers off-load the risk of 
the dire effects of anthropogenic climate change on the habitable commons—
including us. The former disrupted the world economy, which is only recently 
beginning to recover, while the latter will disrupt every community and segment of 
the world in time. The deployment of legislative solutions to create disincentives to 
offloading the risk of “anthropocide,” whether by a carbon tax or otherwise, are 
immediately necessary given what is at stake. In order for those solutions to come 
to fruition, public opinion must demand it first. Therefore, a comprehensible 
narrative showing that the changes will come to local communities is a sufficient 
condition. In other words, we must show that all global citizens are like the 
indigenous people of Kivalina. We are all pre-refugees hoping that the sea ice won’t 
fall into the ocean and carry with it our stories, histories, accomplishments, and 
loved ones.   
Dire social problems like climate change are not necessarily new to the United 
States. This problem is comparable to the problem of de jure racial segregation 
adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson.358 The “legality of separate but equal” was supported 
by the majority of Americans even after Brown v. Board of Education. One need 
                                               
357 Kate Sheppard, If We Can’t Stop this Tiny Alaskan Town from Falling into the Sea, 
What Hope Is There for the Rest of Us?, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 15, 2014, 6:09 PM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/12/alaskan-town-shows-just-how-unprepa 
red-we-are-climate-change [https://perma.cc/BY8D-N2QC]. 
358 See generally 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (addressing racial segregation in transportation). 
434 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
only to look at the photographs of Elizabeth Eckford, one of the Little Rock Nine, 
walking calmly and stoically into the school building to assess the prevailing popular 
opinion concerning racially integrating schools.359 Had it been left up to Congress, 
as driven by popular opinion, to address the issue of school integration, the Civil 
Rights story would be dramatically different. The Climate Crisis is no different. 
Just like in Brown, where the remedy to “separate but equal” was long overdue, 
there was no time to wait. Yes, educating the public, pushing a different narrative, 
and lobbying political leaders was all important. But, lawyers and the cause of action 
brought by their private attorney, Thurgood Marshall, and the bravery of Linda 
Brown and the other plaintiffs were responsible for systemic change. That is the role 
and function of law. To demand change despite public opinion. The law checks our 
base or erroneous decisions even if they are arrived at “rationally” and 
democratically.  
The scientists have done their jobs. The social scientists and psychologists are 
doing their jobs. It is time for lawyers to do ours. While the action on behalf of 
Kivalina failed, we can file others. The psychological research demonstrates the 
deafening sound of silence when trying to answer the question, “how do we get 
people to believe in the immediate risk of climate change?” With no clear answer, 
and with public opinion languishing on demanding action to mitigate climate 
change, it is incumbent upon lawyers and legal scholars to work with their clients to 
creatively seek redress for the Climate Crisis.  
                                               
359 MILDRED A. SCHWARTZ, NAT’L OP. RESEARCH CTR., TRENDS IN WHITE ATTITUDES 
TOWARD NEGROES (1967). 
